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CaseNo.20040939-CA 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) & (c) 
(West 2004); one count of unlawful possession of imitation controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (West 2004); and one count of 
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37a-5 (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did instructing the jury that "the State must eliminate all reasonable doubt" violate 
defendant's due process rights? 
"Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is reviewable under a correction 
of error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling." State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted). 
2. By stipulating that he had a prior conviction for drug possession, did defendant 
invite any error by the court in relying upon that judgment? 
This Court will not review "an error committed at trial when [the appellant] led the 
trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) & (c) (West 2004), Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use 
a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from 
a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;... 
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 7 September 2004, defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
of possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004);1 one count of unlawful possession of imitation 
'Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (West 2004), defendant's prior 
conviction for possession enhanced the current charge from a third degree felony to a second 
degree felony. 
2 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 
(West 2004); and one count of possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). R.26-27. 
After a one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. R.123. Defendant 
was sentenced to the statutory terms. R. 125-26. He timely appealed. R.130. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On the afternoon of 1 March 2004, Jeff Abrams gave his co-worker, defendant, a ride 
home from work. R.141:61, 122. When they were about "150 yards" from defendant's 
parents' house, defendant saw Officer Eberling of the Monticello City Police Department and 
Agent Clark, defendant's parole officer, waiting for him. R. 141:122. Defendant became 
concerned. R141:135. Defendant's "heart was beating fast." Id. Jeff "caught a glimpse of 
[defendant] bending over," and it appeared to him that defendant was "shoving some stuff 
under . . . the chair." R. 141:62. 
When Jeff stopped the truck in front of the house, defendant asked Jeff to leave. Id. 
This was unusual because Jeff would "usually go in and say 'hello' to [defendant's] mother 
and... father." Id. Jeff was "wondering what was going on," so that when he got home he 
"checked under the passenger's seat." Id. He found a black box containing a set of scales 
and some baggies. R.141:63, 109. Jeff was "so mad" that defendant would hide 
"paraphernalia" in his truck that he "went straight to the police station." Id. When he arrived 
2Except as otherwise noted, this brief recited the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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at the police station, he gave Police Chief Adair the items defendant had hidden under the 
seat. R. 141:63,109. Jeff also asked Chief Adair to search his truck; Chief Adair did so, but 
found no other contraband. R.141:63, 110. After leaving the police station, Jeff found a 
glass pipe under the seat, which he turned over to police. R. 141:64, 85. 
Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark searched defendant. R.141:79,99-100. 
Officer Eberling had come to defendant's house to question him about a hit and run accident. 
R.141:79. Agent Clark accompanied Officer Eberling because he had been "having some 
problem[s] with [defendant]," who had been "testing positive for methamphetamine." 
R. 141:100. After searching defendant's bedroom and truck, they took defendant down to the 
police station to question him regarding the hit-and-run accident and "possibly" to administer 
a urinalysis test. R.141:79, 100. 
As they pulled up to the police station, Chief Adair was across the street with Jeff, 
searching his truck. R141:79, 124. Officer Eberling and Agent Clark took defendant into 
the office. R141:79. While they were questioning defendant, Chief Adair knocked on the 
door and handed Officer Eberling the items that Jeff had found under the seat in his truck. 
R141:79, 100. Those items included a bag with a white crystal substance, a black box 
containing a set of scales and a couple of small baggies, and a larger empty bag. R141:80, 
100. Chief Adair explained that defendant had hidden these items under the passenger's seat 
in Jeffs truck. R141:100. 
After Chief Adair left, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark questioned defendant about 
the contraband. Rl41:81, 101. Defendant first denied that the items belonged to him. 
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R141.-101, 126. Eventually, he admitted that the contraband was his. R141:81-82, 101. 
Defendant told the officers that the white crystal substance was not methamphetamine, but 
a cutting agent called "MSM." Rl41:81,101. Defendant explained that he was planning on 
buying an ounce of methamphetamine, which he would mix with the cutting agent in order 
to produce two ounces. Id. Then he could sell one ounce and keep the second ounce for 
himself. Id. Subsequent testing of the white crystal substance confirmed that the white 
substance was not methamphetamine. R141:86. 
Defendant also told the officers that he used the scales to weigh the methamphetamine 
he sold. R141:102. Defendant admitted that two of the baggies had contained 
methamphetamine, which he had already used. Id. Both the baggies and the set of scales 
tested positive for methamphetamine. R141:87. 
At trial, defendant claimed that he did not attempt to hide anything in Jeffs truck and 
that the contraband Jeff gave to Chief Adair did not belong to him. R141:122, 131. 
Although defendant admitted to telling the officers that the contraband belonged to him, he 
claimed to have done so only in an attempt to get Jeff off the hook. R141:129. Defendant 
testified that he believed that the police had pulled Jeff over and found the contraband in his 
truck. R141:127. Because defendant was already in trouble for violating his parole and 
under investigation for a hit-and-run accident, he decided to take responsibility for the 
contraband to protect Jeff. R141:127-28. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT "THE STATE MUST ELIMINATE 
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT" DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial violates the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Br. Aplt. at 10. That reasonable 
doubt instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), 
overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, informed the jury 
that "[t]he State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 113 (addendum A). However, 
after trial, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly abandoned]" the "'obviate all reasonable 
doubt' element of the Robertson test." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 30, 116 P.3d 305. 
Relying on Reyes, defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction here created 
a "substantial risk that a juror found [defendant] guilty based on a degree of proof below 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. at 13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
A. Defendant's Reyes claim is unpreserved and does not arise under 
"exceptional circumstances," 
Defendant's Reyes challenge is not properly before this Court. "As a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 'bring all 
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to the give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^  14, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting State 
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v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993)). To preserve a claim, a defendant must 
specify the alleged error so that the trial court can "'assess [the] allegations by isolating 
relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at 
issue.'" Id. at*i 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). "[T]he preservation rule applies to 
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11. 
The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant concedes that the issue he presses was not preserved by trial counsel. See 
Br. Aplt. at 13. However, he argues that the fact that Reyes was not decided until after his 
trial constitutes an exceptional circumstance excusing his failure to preserve the claim. See 
Br. Aplt. at 13-14. In effect, he argues that he could not object at trial, because the basis for 
his objection did not yet exist. 
This very argument was rejected by the supreme court in State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child. On appeal, he argued that 
a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due process principles announced in 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. At trial, Lopez had 
not objected on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been decided. Id. On appeal, the 
supreme court had to "determine whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal." Id. 
The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the first time on 
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appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances' 
exceptions exist." Id. 
The case at bar is indistinguishable. Nothing prevented defendant from challenging 
the reasonable doubt instruction even before Reyes was decided. In Reyes itself, the State 
argued that the Robertson three-part test was unconstitutional, despite the absence of any 
authority declaring it unconstitutional. Moreover, here, the court of appeals, in an opinion 
issued before defendant's trial, described the Robertson three-part test as "constitutionally 
flawed" and "not consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." See State v. 
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, If 22,30,84 P.3d 841. Nothing prevented defendant from preserving 
his issue by making this argument at trial 
This claim is thus barred.3 
B. Defendant's Reyes challenge fails because the prosecutor did not 
argue that the State needed to refute only "doubts that are 
sufficiently defined." 
Defendant's claim lacks merit in any event. The due process danger identified in the 
Reyes opinion did not arise here. 
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial, reproduced here in its entirety, 
contained the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt": 
3
 Defendant does not claim that this Court can review his challenge to the reasonable 
doubt instruction because the error was structural. See Br. Aplt. at 13-14. Whether failure 
to object to a reasonable doubt instruction forecloses a claim of structural error is a question 
the supreme court left unresolved in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 18, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 
30. 
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A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial. 
If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
should be acquitted. 
The state must eliminate all reasonable doubt Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a 
doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act 
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
R. 113 (emphasis added) (addendum A). For purposes of this appeal, the State does not 
dispute defendant's assertion that "eliminate all reasonable doubt," the phrase employ ed here, 
and "obviate all reasonable doubt," the phrase required by Robertson and rejected by Reyes, 
are functionally equivalent. 
The Reyes court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "[i]nsightfiil and 
important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, % 26. 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor [v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the 
doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation 
of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an 
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. 
9 
Id. at J^ 27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test would 
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at J^ 28. 
Reyes thus holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden 
of proof only to the extent it would "permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts 
that are sufficiently defined." Id. Consequently, where the State does not argue that it need 
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the "obviate test" does not diminish the 
State's constitutional burden. 
Defendant here does not claim, nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutor 
argued that the State need obviate only those doubts that are "sufficiently defined." See Br. 
Aplt. at 10-14. Referring to the elements instruction, the prosecutor stated, "the State has 
proven everything on this page beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 141: 165. In rebuttal she 
stated that defense counsel's "job is to raise a reasonable doubt, and he's done the best job 
he can, but he can't get over the hurdle of the State's evidence in this case." R. 141: 177. 
She thus argued that the State's evidence foreclosed all reasonable doubt. She did not argue 
that she need not refute any doubts because they were not "sufficiently defined." Reyes, 
2005 UT 33,f28. 
Defendant's claim fails for another reason. "[S]o long as the reasonable doubt 
instructions, 'taken as a whole,... correctly convey [ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury,' they pass constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,120,530 Utah Adv. Rep. 
30 (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994)). "Simply put, [the court] need only 
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ask whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of 
reasonable doubt, namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
he is charged."5 Id at f 21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In Cruz, the 
supreme court approved a reasonable doubt instruction containing the sentence, "The law 
does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it 
dispel all reasonable doubt." Id. at f 11. In the context of reasonable doubt instructions, 
"dispel," "obviate," and "eliminate" are synonyms. So in effect, the Cruz jury, like the jury 
here, was told that the State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt." Yet the Supreme Court 
approved the instruction. 
The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as a whole," 
they "correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 
f^ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept was conveyed not only 
by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted above, but also by others. See R. 107 ("In order 
to obtain a conviction, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt") ("If you believe that the state has proven each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty."); R. 108 ("If 
there was enough methamphetamine to test, there was enough methamphetamine to possess, 
provided the state proved all the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
In sum, even if defendant's claim were not waived, it fails on the merits. 
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II 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO HIS PRIOR CONVICTION 
FAILS BECAUSE HE INVITED THE ALLEGED ERROR HE 
CLAIMS ON APPEAL 
Defendant claims that the judgment in his first conviction for possession was not final, 
and therefore the prior conviction may not be used to enhance his present conviction. Aplt. 
Br. at 15. In effect, defendant argues that because the judgment from his first conviction for 
possession incorrectly stated that he pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute, the 
judgment is of no effect. Id. 
Following jury selection, defense counsel told the trial court that defendant, if found 
guilty, would stipulate to the prior possession conviction that enhanced the current charge 
from a third to a second degree felony. R.141:50-51. Defense counsel also explained that 
the prior judgment contained an error. R .141:48-49. Specifically, the judgment stated that 
defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute, whereas defendant in fact pled 
guilty only to simple possession. R. 141:48. Defense counsel represented that the error was 
simply clerical. Id. He further explained that he had discussed the discrepancy with 
defendant and that defendant was still willing to stipulate to the prior conviction. R. 141:49. 
Defense counsel then asked defendant, "Maybe we need to get that prior judgment amended; 
but do you acknowledge that you do have a prior possession of a controlled substance 
[conviction]?" Id. Defendant responded, "Yeah." Id. Defense counsel explained that he 
"want[ed] to make a record of that. I just don't want that to be an appealable issue 
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somewhere down the road that [defendant is] saying that there was some type of—or making 
some type of collateral attack on that original judgment." Id. 
After the jury found defendant guilty, he stipulated to his previous possession 
conviction. R. 141:183. Defendant then requested to be sentenced immediately. R. 141:185. 
The trial court asked if there was "[a]ny legal reason why sentence should not be 
pronounced?" R. 141:187. Defense counsel responded, "None, your Honor." Id. Thereafter, 
the trial court ruled that defendant had been previously convicted of possession, which 
enhanced the current conviction from a third degree to a second degree felony: 
It's apparently conceded that the charge in case 9717-41 that the defendant 
actually pled guilty to was possession of a controlled substance; and there was 
just a clerical error in the judgment itself. He's—so he has clearly the 
predicate previous offense to make this a second degree felony. 
R.141:187-88. The trial court then sentenced defendant. R.141:188. Defense counsel then 
asked the trial court if it would "consider an order—a motion at this time to amend the 
judgment in the other case?" Id. The trial court responded, "I would hope that [the 
prosecutor] would take care of that now." Id. She stated that she would. Id.4 
4According to the docketing statement for case number 9717-41, the judgment was 
amended 12 October and 14 October 2004. See Docket Case Number 9717-41 at 4, 
Addendum B. 
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A. Defendant invited any alleged error by stipulating to his 
prior conviction. 
This Court has "held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 n.20, 
560-561 (Utah 1987) (notwithstanding plain error exception to preservation rule, invited 
error viewed with disfavor and will operate to waive claim on appeal). A party invites error 
by representing to the court that he or she has no objection to a proposed course of action. 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, «|[ 54, 70 P.3d 111 ("if counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, 
we will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception"). 
Moreover, "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error 
rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App.1991). 
Defendant invited the alleged error he now complains of. Despite a clerical error in 
the prior judgment, defendant twice stipulated that he had a prior convicted for possession. 
Before the start of trial, defense counsel explained to the trial court that there was a clerical 
error in defendant's prior judgment for possession of a controlled substance. R. 141: 48-49. 
He further stated that he had discussed the error with defendant and that defendant was still 
willing to stipulate to the prior conviction. Id. Instead of claiming that the error rendered 
the judgment invalid, defendant stipulated to the prior conviction. 
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After the verdict, defendant again stipulated to his prior possession conviction. 
R. 141:183. Thereafter, defendant invited the trial court to impose sentence without 
correcting the prior judgment. Further, when the trial court asked if there was any legal 
reason why sentence should not be imposed, defense counsel responded, "None, your 
Honor." R. 141:187. The reason for counsel's stance is obvious: whether the prior 
conviction was for simple possession or possession with intent to distribute, it enhanced the 
current offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (West 2004). 
In sum, defendant invited the alleged error he now complains of. 
B. The trial court did not commit error when it sentenced 
defendant before the prior judgment was amended. 
Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, the trial court did not commit error. 
As stated, defendant is essentially claiming that a final judgment with a clerical error 
has no effect. Aplt. Br. at 15. According to Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
"[cjlerical mistakes in judgments... may be corrected by the court at any time and after such 
notice, if any, as the court may order." (emphasis added). "A clerical error, as 
contradistinguished from judicial error, is not 'the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial 
reasoning and determination.'" State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
State v. Mossman, 706 P.2d 203, 204 (Or. App. 1985) (additional quotation omitted). To 
determine whether the mistake is a clerical one, this Court looks to the record "to harmonize 
the intent of the [trial] court with the written judgment." Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v. 
Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986). 
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Once a court determines that a judgment contains a clerical error, it has the authority 
to amend the judgment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). The supreme court has described the 
amending of a clerical error as nunc pro tunc. See Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298,299 (Utah 
1984) ("Insofar as the correction of clerical errors is concerned, we have long recognized the 
power of the courts . . . to do an act upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date so 
that the record accurately reflects that which took place."); see generally State v. Johnson, 
635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (recognizing that action taken nunc pro tunc has a "retroactive" effect). 
Thus, simply because a written judgment contains a clerical error, it does not render that 
judgment of no effect. See Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co,, 579 P.2d 917, 918 (holding trial 
court may correct clerical error after appellate court has affirmed trial court's decree). 
Here, defense counsel explained that the mistake in the prior judgment was simply a 
clerical error. R. 141:48. Following the trial, the trial court also agreed that the error in the 
prior judgment was clerical. R. 141:187-88. Thereafter, the trial court stated that it hoped 
that the prosecutor would amend the prior judgment. R. 141:18 8. The prosecutor stated that 
she would. Id. Thus, all parties agreed that the error in the prior judgment was clerical. See 
State v. Diviney, 2004 UT App 178, f 2, 2004 WL 1368190 (unpublished memorandum 
decision) (judgment contained clerical error by stating that Diviney pled guilty to aggravated 
burglary instead of simple burglary); Lawler v. State, 2002 UT App 437, Tf 3, 2002 WL 
31875661 (unpublished memorandum decision) (judgment contained clerical error by stating 
that Lawler was convicted of rape instead of forcible sexual abuse).5 
5In compliance with Utah R. App. P. 30(f), accurate copies of both Diviney and 
Lawler are attached at Addendum C. 
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Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertion, clerical errors do not render a prior 
judgment of no effect. 
In addition, the trial court treated defendant's prior conviction as a conviction for 
possession and not possession with intent to distribute. Thus, even if this Court held that the 
trial court committed error, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). In the case 
at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. 
P. 29(a)(3). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on & September 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
U FREDERIC VORC 
Assistant Attorney General 
lef, Appeals Division 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. t 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must eliminate ^(reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, 
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince 
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough 
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that 
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the 
case. 
Addendum B 
7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. ERIC HALLS 
CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony 
CHARGES 
58-37-8(1AII) - DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO'DIST C/S Charge 1 
(amended) 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: May 16, 
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(1AII) 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: May 16, 
Charge 3 - 58-37-8(1AII) 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: May 16, 
Plea: May 16, 1997 Guilty 
1997 {Guilty Plea} 
- DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
1997 Dismissed 
- DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
1997 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
LYLE R. ANDERSON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - ERIC HALLS 
DRAPER, UT 
Represented by: WILLIAM L SCHULTZ 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: WILLIAM L BENGE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: ERIC HALLS 
Offense tracking number: 9002643 
Date of Birth: November 22, 1977 
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Prosecuting Agency: SAN JUAN COUNTY 
Violation Date: April 15, 1996 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Printed: 07/21/05 09:45:04 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony 
Amount P a i d : 
lount C r e d i t : 
B a l a n c e : 
2 . 0 0 
0 .00 
0 .00 
CASE NOTE 
***UTAH STATE PRISONER*** 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-19-97 Information filed 
02-19-97 Initial Appearance scheduled on March 20, 1997 at 09:31 AM in 
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. 
02-20-97 Note: Update: Gave Mark Ewart Order to Produce Prisoner to 
forward to prison 
03-20-97 Minute Entry - Initial Appearance 
Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: SHELLY BROWN 
Prosecutor: WILLIAM L. BENGE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ 
Audio 
Tape Number: 7-50 Tape Count: 780 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant advised of charges and penalties. 
Case recalled 50/1523. Defendant demanded a preliminary hearing. 
03-20-97 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:30 PM in 
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. 
03-21-97 Filed: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR COURT APPOINTED 
COUNSEL-APPOINTED 
03-24-97 Filed: ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER W/CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
03-27-97 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF THE SERVICE OF THE REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA 
Party Served: LYLE BAYLAS 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: March 31, 1997 
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA 
Party Served: C I 108 
Service Type: Substitute 
Service Date: March 31, 1997 
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA 
Party Served: C I 109 
Service Type: Substitute 
Service Date: March 31, 1997 
05-13-97 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:29 PM in 
Printed: 07/21/05 09:45:06 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony 
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. 
05-15-97 Change of Plea scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:29 PM in 
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. 
05-15-97 Preliminary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 5/16/97 
05-16-97 Charge 1 amended 
05-16-97 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty Plea 
05-16-97 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed 
05-16-97 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed 
05-16-97 Minute Entry - Arraignment 
Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shellyb 
Prosecutor: WILLIAM L. BENGE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ 
Audio 
Tape Number: 97-97 Tape Count: 5958 
ARRAIGNMENT 
Defendant advised of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives preliminary hearing. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
Defendant has 30 days to withdraw his plea of guilty. The state 
consents to the waiving of the preliminary hearing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SAN JUAN County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Defendant is to serve this sentence concurrent with any other 
prison sentences. 
Defendant is remanded to the custody of the prison. All parties 
signed the defendant's statement. 
05-16-97 Filed: STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
05-28-97 Filed order: ORDER Preliminary Hearing Waived 
Judge landerso 
Signed May 27, 1997 
Printed: 07/21/05 09:45:08 Page 3 
CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony 
05-28-97 Filed judgment: FINDINGS, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT W/CERTIFICATE 
OF MAILING 
Judge landerso 
Signed May 16, 1997 
03-11-98 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
03-11-98 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
10-12-04 Filed order: AMENDED JUDGMENT AND C OMMITMENT TO UJTAH STATE 
PRISON 
Judge janderso 
Signed October 12, 2004 
10-14-04 Filed order: SECOND AMENDEDJUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH 
STATE PRISON 
Judge janderso 
Signed October 14, 2004 
Printed: 07/21/05 09:45:08 Page 4 (last) 
Addendum C 
Wfestlaw 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d5 2004 WL 1368190 (Utah AppO, 2004 UT App 178 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1368190 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Lee DIVINEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020220-CA. 
June 4, 2004. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The 
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. 
Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, JACKSON, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
*1 We have determined that M[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record[,] and the decisional process would not 
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented 
are readily resolved under applicable law. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides 
that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or 
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time." In addition, "clerical errors 
... may be corrected at any time." State v. Lorrah, 
761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988). Defendant 
alleges, and the State agrees, that the trial court 
committed a clerical error when it entered a 
judgment, sentence, and commitment that 
reflected Defendant pled guilty to aggravated 
burglary, when Defendant was actually charged 
with and pled guilty to simple burglary. We agree 
that a clerical error was made by the trial court, 
and, therefore, in order "to harmonize the intent 
of the [trial] court with the written judgment," id. 
at 1389, we remand to the trial court for entry of a 
corrected judgment to reflect Defendant's guilty 
plea to burglary rather than aggravated burglary. 
Defendant raises several issues regarding the 
restitution award, the first of which pertains to the 
calculation of lost wages. According to Defendant's 
recalculation, with which the State agrees, the 
victim should only have been awarded $1,978.25 in 
lost wages. Therefore, we remand so the trial court 
can adjust the restitution amount accordingly. 
Next, Defendant argues that the victim was 
improperly compensated for lost wages on 
"charge-off days. The victim testified that she 
could have worked at both jobs on charge-off days, 
and, therefore, that she is entitled to compensation 
for lost wages from the school district because, due 
to the injuries she suffered, she was unable to work 
at the school district on such days. Defendant points 
out that, prior to the injuries, the victim never 
worked both jobs on charge-off days and even after 
her recovery, she never worked both jobs on such 
days. 
Section 76-3-201 defines restitution as "full, partial 
or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim" of criminal activity, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3- 201(l)(d) (2003), and pecuniary damages as 
"all special damages, but not general damages." Id. § 
76-3-201(l)(c). But see State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT 
App 417,HH 19-28, 82 P.3d 211 (Orme, J., 
concurring). Special damages consist of "actual loss 
of past earnings and anticipated loss of future 
earnings." Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-411(4)(d) 
(Supp.2003). In seeking compensable damages, the 
victim must show that a loss has actually occurred. 
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See Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 
944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997). The State failed to 
prove that the victim ever actually worked on 
charge-off days at the school district either before 
the incidents involving Defendant or after her 
recovery. Based on her actual work history, the 
victim is not entitled to recover lost wages from the 
school district on charge-off days. The trial court is 
instructed to make the appropriate adjustment on 
remand. 
*2 Defendant's other restitution claims were not 
preserved for appeal and need not be reached. Rule 
24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires that Defendant cite "to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court." Although Defendant did cite to the 
record where he objected to the restitution in 
general and to certain specific items included in the 
restitution award, Defendant failed to specifically 
object to the July 18, 2001 lost wages, the alarm 
system installation at her son's house, and the 
quarterly payments due on both alarm systems 
following the first incident. "Generally, a defendant 
who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is 
barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). See also Harris v. IES Assocs., 2003 
UT App 112^ 51, 69 P.3d 297 (holding that 
"general reference[s] to the trial transcript volumes" 
are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of rule 
24(a)(5)(A)). 
We remand to the trial court to correct the clerical 
error to reflect Defendant's guilty plea to burglary 
and to adjust the amount of restitution as specified 
herein. Otherwise, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Judge. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sylvester LAWLER, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20011006-CA. 
Dec. 27, 2002. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs. 
Sylvester Lawler, Draper, Appellant Pro Se. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Appellant Sylvester Lawler appeals the denial 
of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Lawler was charged with one count each of rape 
and forcible sodomy, both first degree felonies. 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to a 
single count of forcible sexual abuse, a second 
degree felony. Approximately one month before the 
change of plea, Lawler's retained counsel moved to 
withdraw on the basis that Lawler was unable to pay 
him. The district court denied the motion, and 
Lawler's retained counsel continued to represent 
him through entry of the guilty plea, conviction, and 
sentencing. The district court conducted a detailed 
examination at the change of plea hearing during 
which Lawler expressed his satisfaction with 
counsel's representation and his belief that the plea 
was in his best interest and was not motivated by his 
counsel's financial concerns. 
In the petition for post-conviction relief, Lawler 
claimed that (1) he received ineffective assistance 
and his counsel had a conflict of interest; (2) his 
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (3) 
the written judgment and sentence incorrectly stated 
that he was convicted of rape. Although the original 
judgment contained a clerical error made in 
reducing the sentence to a written judgment, the 
court amended the judgment to correctly reflect a 
conviction of forcible sexual abuse, rather than 
rape. The court sent the corrected judgment and 
sentence to Lawler and to the Board of Pardons. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed 
as moot the claim that Lawler was convicted of, or 
sentenced for, the wrong offense. 
The district court concluded, based upon review of 
the record in the original criminal proceeding, that 
trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance 
and the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The 
detailed plea colloquy fully explored and disposed 
of any claim that Lawler was dissatisfied with his 
legal representation. This included Lawler's 
admission that he believed the guilty plea was in his 
best interest and was not motivated by counsel's 
financial concerns. In addition, the negotiated plea 
was clearly advantageous because Lawler had 
confessed to having sexual intercourse with, and 
sodomizing, the minor victim, which was also 
supported by physical evidence. 
Lawler's post-conviction claim that he was offered, 
and believed that he had accepted, a negotiated plea 
bargain that would have allowed him to plea guilty 
to two third degree felonies was not supported by 
the trial court record. The plea colloquy and 
statement of defendant clearly set forth the offense 
to which Lawler pleaded guilty and negated the 
existence of any other promises. The district court 
correctly concluded that the record demonstrated 
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Lawler understood the plea that he ultimately 
entered. 
Finally, the district court correctly rejected a 
post-conviction claim that the psychosexual 
evaluation of Lawler was inaccurate because it did 
not challenge the conviction or sentence. 
*2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial 
of post-conviction relief. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 31875661 (Utah 
App.), 2002 UT App 437 
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